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QUINE’S ARGUMENT FROM DESPAIR 
 
Sander Verhaegh 
 
Quine’s argument for a naturalized epistemology is routinely perceived as 
an argument from despair: traditional epistemology must be abandoned 
because all attempts to deduce our scientific theories from sense 
experience have failed. In this paper, I will show that this picture is 
historically inaccurate and that Quine’s argument against first philosophy 
is considerably stronger and subtler than the standard conception suggests. 
For Quine, the first philosopher’s quest for foundations is inherently 
incoherent; the very idea of a self-sufficient sense datum language is a 
mistake as there is no science-independent perspective from which to 
validate science. I will argue that a great deal of the confusion surrounding 
Quine’s argument is prompted by certain phrases in his seminal 
‘Epistemology Naturalized’. Scrutinizing Quine’s work both before and 
after the latter paper provides a better key to understanding his remarkable 
views about the epistemological relation between theory and evidence. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to W.V. Quine, naturalism can be characterized negatively as the 
abandonment of a ‘first philosophy’ prior to science. The Quinean naturalist argues 
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that all inquiry starts from within our scientific conceptual scheme and that we ought 
to repudiate “the Cartesian dream of a foundation for scientific certainty firmer than 
scientific method itself” (1990, 19). Where traditional epistemology aspired to 
contain science by attempting to “construct it somehow from sense data”, the 
naturalist rather sees epistemology as “contained in natural science” (1969a, 83).  But 
what exactly are Quine’s reasons for rejecting first philosophy? Why, in other words, 
does Quine believe that he is bound to evaluate our epistemic practices from within, 
that he “is the busy sailor adrift on Neurath’s boat” (1975a, 72)? In the present paper, 
I will examine Quine's ideas about first philosophy and reconstruct his surprising 
argument for dismissing the project. 
Prima facie, Quine's argument against first philosophy seems to be pretty 
straightforward: we ought to abandon traditional epistemology because, historically, 
all attempts to ground our beliefs have failed. In his seminal “Epistemology 
Naturalized”, for example, Quine divides traditional epistemology into a doctrinal and 
a conceptual program and argues that neither of them can be carried out satisfactorily. 
On the doctrinal side, Hume’s problem of induction prevents us from deducing our 
beliefs about the world from basic observation statements.  On the conceptual side, 
Quine criticizes the epistemologist’s attempts to translate our theoretical concepts in 
sensory terms. In particular, he criticizes Carnap’s project of rational reconstruction, 
arguing that it fails to “offer any key to translating the sentences of science into terms 
of observation, logic, and set theory” (1969a, 77). As an alternative to these projects, 
Quine proposes his naturalized epistemology, the study of how theory and evidence 
are actually related:  
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If all we hope for is a reconstruction that links science to experience in explicit 
ways short of translation, then it would seem more sensible to settle for 
psychology. Better to discover how science is in fact developed and learned 
than to fabricate a fictitious structure to a similar effect.  
(ibid., 78) 
 
Where the traditional epistemologist rejects such a naturalism as circular, Quine 
believes that he is free to use scientific knowledge in his inquiries: “scruples against 
circularity have little point once we have stopped dreaming of deducing science from 
observations” (ibid., 76). 
Let me call this the standard conception of Quine’s argument against first 
philosophy. In the standard conception, we are justified in adopting a naturalized 
epistemology only after we have established that all attempts to reduce our 
knowledge to sense experience have failed. Quine’s argument, in other words, is 
construed as a conditional argument: we can legitimately take on a naturalized 
epistemology only when we have demonstrated that we ought to “stop dreaming of 
deducing science from sense data” (1969a, 84) and that we ought to “despair of being 
able to define theoretical terms generally in terms of phenomena” (1975a, 72). The 
Quinean naturalist is not a ‘busy sailor’ from birth, but “someone who later elects to 
enlist, perhaps in reaction to some deep disappointment” (Maddy 2007, 85). Quine’s 
argument, in short, is pictured as an argument from despair.1  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 This apposite phrase is David Shatz’s:  “Quine arrived at [his] proposal by route of an argument we 
might term the argument from despair. The traditional project of validating common sense and 
scientific beliefs in the face of skeptical challenge has been, and is doomed to be, a failure; therefore, 
the project is best dropped” (1993, 117). According to Shatz, the alternative to an argument from 
despair is a dialectical naturalism, which aims to “confront the problem of skepticism and of circularity 
head on”. Shatz believes that Quine in some places “provides a partial defense of dialectical 
naturalism”  (ibid., 120). 
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The standard conception is widespread among both Quine scholars and critics. In 
“The Key to Interpreting Quine”, for example, Roger F. Gibson summarizes Quine’s 
arguments against the doctrinal and the conceptual program and concludes that “[t]he 
thesis that there is no first philosophy is a comment on the failure of traditional 
epistemologists to find a foundation outside of science upon which science […] can 
be justified” (1992, 17). Similarly, Peter Hacker claims that “[t]he failure of the 
Carnapian enterprise seemed to Quine to warrant the naturalization of epistemology” 
(2006, 236), and Penelope Maddy argues that the Quinean naturalist seems to be 
“driven to her position by ‘despair’ at the failure of any or all attempts to ‘ground’ 
science” (2007, 85).2  
Still, there seems to be something odd about the standard conception. For one 
thing, Quine's argument from despair only occurs in “Epistemology Naturalized” 
(1969a) and in “Five Milestones of Empiricism” (1975a).3 The argument is strangely 
absent in Quine's work before and after these two papers, even when he discusses the 
distinction between traditional and naturalized epistemology. This gap is particularly 
apparent in From Stimulus to Science (1995). In the first chapter of this book, Quine 
gives an extended summary of the traditional quest for certainty, starting with 
sceptical worries about our knowledge of the external world and ending with 
Carnap’s project of rational reconstruction. Yet in the second chapter, which deals 
with his naturalism, Quine nowhere uses the traditional epistemologists’ failure as an 
argument for adopting a naturalistic perspective. Rather, he reflects about the 
“phenomenalistic orientation” of the traditional project, i.e. about “[t]he idea of a self-
sufficient sensory language as a foundation for science” (1995a, 15).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See also, for example, (Roth 1999, §2), (Kertész 2002, §3), and (Fogelin 2004, 19-27).	  
3	  In the latter paper, Quine claims that the argument is only “one source” of naturalism (p. 72).	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Second, if the argument from despair were all he had to offer, Quine would not 
have made a particularly strong case for his naturalized epistemology. For, as many 
epistemologists have objected, it is one thing to dismiss the traditional quest for 
absolute foundations, it is quite another thing to reject the search for justification tout 
court and to claim that “[e]pistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place 
as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science” (Quine 1969a, 82).4  Quine 
only shows that we cannot completely ground our beliefs on sense experience, an 
argument that is too weak to convince any first philosopher who shares the former's 
scepticism about the Cartesian dream. In response to Quine's despair, traditional 
epistemologists could easily adopt a “moderate first philosophy, which eschews 
certainty but which allows for the independence (of epistemology from science) 
sought by the traditionalist” (Siegel 1995, 53). They could, for example, require “of 
our basic beliefs only some degree of initial credibility rather than Cartesian 
certainty” (Kim 1988, 388).  
In this paper, I will argue that the standard conception is mistaken. I will show that 
Quine’s argument against the first philosopher is considerably stronger than the 
standard conception suggests. In his work both before and after “Epistemology 
Naturalized”, Quine does not abandon traditional epistemology out of despair but 
because the project is demonstrably flawed from the beginning. According to Quine, 
it is a mistake to believe that one can develop a self-sufficient sensory-language, 
independent of our best scientific theories of the world. The first philosopher does not 
fail because he aims at Cartesian certainty, but because he presupposes that he can 
adopt some science-independent perspective. I will argue, in short, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The loci classici of this argument are (Putnam 1981) and (Kim 1988).	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“Epistemology Naturalized”, when considered in isolation from the rest of his work, 
misrepresents the strength of Quine’s position.5 
What I will offer, then, is a reconstruction of Quine’s actual argument against first 
philosophy, focusing on his work both before and after “Epistemology Naturalized”. 
This paper will be structured as follows. I will start by outlining the standard 
conception and examining Quine’s argument from despair (§2), after which I will 
introduce his stronger argument (§3) and show how he uses it to dismiss both the 
traditional epistemologist (§4) and the sceptic (§5). Next, I will analyze Quine’s 
positive views about the theory-evidence relation, which underlie his argument, and 
show that his position is more nuanced than it might initially seem to be (§6-7). I will 
end this paper with some recommendations as to how we might better read 
“Epistemology Naturalized” in the light of these findings (§8).6 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	   In this paper I will focus exclusively on Quine’s negative claim, i.e. on his argument against 
traditional epistemology. My claim that Quine’s position is stronger than what is suggested by 
“Epistemology Naturalized”, therefore, only applies to his argument against first philosophy, not to his 
positive views about what a post-first-philosophical epistemology should look like.	  
6 A great deal of the confusion on the part of the standard conception seems to be triggered by certain 
phrases in “Epistemology Naturalized”. I am not the first to point at the somewhat problematic relation 
between this paper and the rest of Quine's work. See, for example, (Putnam 1981, 244) and (Johnsen 
2005). Johnsen concludes that Quine himself is to blame for this confusion: “the fault lies not in the 
universal incompetence of the essay's readers, but rather in a disastrous failure of its author’s outsized 
gifts as an expositor of his own views” (ibid., 79). For the purposes of this paper, it should be noted 
that Johnsen focuses almost exclusively on Quine’s positive claim that epistemology becomes a 
chapter of psychology; a claim that, according to Johnsen, wrongly implies that Quine comes to reject 
normative epistemological questions. I take it that my reading of Quine in this paper is compatible with 
Johnsen’s interpretation and see my main claim as complementary: not only does “Epistemology 
Naturalized” fail to delineate Quine’s positive views, as Johnsen claims, it also misrepresents the 
arguments that are available to him in rejecting traditional epistemology. 
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2. FROM CERTAINTY TO STRAIGHT PSYCHOLOGY 
 
Although we seem to know a great many things about ourselves and the world around 
us, we can never be absolutely sure that our beliefs are true. Even our best scientific 
theories might turn out to be false or to rest on misguided assumptions. According to 
Quine, traditional epistemology starts from a deep dissatisfaction with this situation: 
“the theory of knowledge has its origin in doubt, in scepticism. Doubt is what 
prompts us to try to develop a theory of knowledge” (1975b, 257). In order to restore 
confidence in both our everyday convictions and our scientific theories, traditional 
epistemologists seek to ground our beliefs upon something more secure. Quine often 
refers to this project as ‘the Cartesian dream’, the dream of an indubitable foundation 
for our beliefs about ourselves and our surroundings. 
In his analysis of the epistemologists' quest for certainty, Quine has focused almost 
exclusively on empiricist attempts to ground our knowledge.7 In his discussion of 
empiricist epistemology, Quine distinguishes two projects: one doctrinal and one 
conceptual. The doctrinal project is concerned with truth and aims at inferring our 
beliefs about the world, especially our well-established scientific theories, from basic 
observation statements. The conceptual project, on the other hand, is concerned with 
meaning and aims at translating our scientific concepts in sensory terms. The two 
projects are connected: if one succeeds in defining all scientific concepts in sensory 
terms, then one’s scientific beliefs and one’s basic observation statements will be 
couched in the same sensory language, an accomplishment that will enable one to 
examine whether the former can be derived from the latter (Quine 1969a, 69-71). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 An exception is (Quine 1946, 54-9), where he explicitly discusses epistemological rationalism before 
rejecting it. Most notably, Quine questions whether the rationalist can be certain that her innate ideas 
are true, even if they seem self-evident. 
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According to Quine, the classical empiricists failed in both respects. On the 
conceptual side of epistemology, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume were unable to indicate 
how our complex ideas about the world can be constructed out of indubitable simple 
ones; defining even the very notion of an enduring physical body turned out to be 
problematic (1946, 57-77). Still, their problems were worse on the doctrinal side. For 
Quine, it was Hume who showed that it is impossible to establish a deductive relation 
between theory and evidence even if both are couched in the same sensory language; 
neither general statements nor singular statements about the future can be deduced 
from any finite set of sensory evidence (1969a, 71-2). 
Quine is convinced that there is no progress to be made with respect to the 
doctrinal project: “The Humean predicament is the human predicament” (ibid., 72). 
Although the value of inductive reasoning in science can hardly be underestimated, 
the traditional epistemologist simply has to admit that we are never strictly entitled to 
rely on induction (1994b, 231-3). Still, there was progress to be made with respect to 
the conceptual project. Quine argues that some major advances in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth century breathed new life into the empiricists’ program. Both Jeremy 
Bentham's method of contextual definition and the development of set theory revived 
the conceptual project. Quine credits Carnap as the philosopher who actually 
attempted to carry out the project by using these formal tools to construct our beliefs 
about the world out of primary sense experiences. According to Quine, the latter's 
Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (1928) constituted “a masterful construction” of the 
external world from the data of sensation “using the sophisticated devices of 
mathematical logic” (1987, 144). 
Although Quine has always applauded the ingenuity of Carnap’s constructions, he 
is convinced that the Aufbau ultimately failed to provide a truly satisfactory 
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reduction. According to Quine, Carnap’s constitutional system collapsed when he 
attempted to assign the subjective sense qualities in our visual field⎯i.e. the colors in 
our two-dimensional visual space⎯to points in the three-dimensional physical space 
order, a manoeuvre that Carnap believed to be “one of the most important steps in the 
constructional system” (1928, §124). The idea, as Quine notes, was to translate 
sentences of the form “Quality q is at point-instant x;y;z;t” in terms of the 
fundamental notions that Carnap allowed in his constructional scheme (1951, 40). 
Instead of providing a full translation of our color-assignments, however, Carnap was 
only able to provide a list of desiderata that any assignment of colors to space-time 
points should satisfy “a far as possible”, while being aware that they can never be 
“precisely satisfied” (§126).  
It is important to see why Carnap’s reduction broke down at this point. Carnap’s 
desiderata for assigning colors to world points only prescribe a complete assignment, 
not a point-by-point allocation. The reason for this is that one needs to distinguish 
between genuine information from the outside world and subjective color experiences 
such as hallucinations and disturbances of the eye (ibid.). The problem for Carnap is 
that one can only judge whether some experience is hallucinated, when one examines 
whether it fits in one's total allocation of visual experiences over time. One cannot 
judge whether a single experience is hallucinated on the basis of that very experience 
alone; “the assignment of sense qualities to public place-times has to be kept open to 
revision in the light of later experience, and so cannot be reduced to definition” 
(Quine 1966, 85). In consequence, one cannot assign one color to a particular space-
time point without considering its place holistically in the total color-to-world 
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allocation. Carnap’s construction broke down, in other words, because he failed to 
take into account the holistic nature of the theory-evidence relation.8  
In response to his failure to develop a satisfactory criterion of empirical 
significance, Carnap radically altered his views after the Aufbau. In his “Testability 
and Meaning” (1936/1937), Carnap gave up on the idea that theoretical sentences 
should be strictly translatable into the observation language if they are to be 
empirically significant. Instead, he introduced a liberal form of reduction that allows 
theoretical sentences to be correlated with lower level sensory sentences in a way 
short of translatability. Rather than demanding strict reductions such that theoretical 
sentences are eliminated in favor of observation sentences, Carnap now also admitted 
reduction sentences that define new theoretical terms only relative to certain specified 
experimental conditions.9  
In “Epistemology Naturalized”, Quine argues that Carnap's adjustments were fatal 
for traditional epistemology. For, in dispensing with reduction by elimination, “the 
empiricist is conceding that the empirical meanings of typical statements about the 
external world are inaccessible and ineffable” (1969a, 78-9). That is, in allowing a 
more liberal form of reduction, Carnap acknowledged that he would never be able to 
completely specify the empirical meanings of isolated theoretical sentences. 
“Epistemology Naturalized”, in other words, construes Carnap's concession as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See also (Quine 1984, 125-6): “[a] typical single sentence of a theory has no distinctive empirical 
content of its own; it can be singled out for testing, but only by agreeing meanwhile to hold other 
sentences of the cluster immune […] in the Aufbau the very mechanism of [this] Duhem effect is 
strikingly and imaginatively depicted.” 
9 See (Carnap 1936/1937, §8) for a definition of reduction sentences. Shortly after “Testability and 
Meaning”, Carnap recognized that even these partial definitions were not yet liberal enough. Again the 
problem was the holistic character of the theory-evidence relation. See (Carnap 1956, 68). In response, 
Carnap proposed an even more liberal criterion of empirical significance. Yet, even this definition did 
not fully implement the lessons of holism as Quine shows in his (1984, 125). 
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natural endpoint for traditional epistemology. Where Hume had already demonstrated 
that we cannot hope to fulfill the doctrinal project, Carnap's Aufbau showed that the 
conceptual project is too demanding as well. Quine argues that to “relax the demand 
for definition, and settle for a kind of reduction that does not eliminate, is to renounce 
the last remaining advantage that […] rational reconstruction [had] over straight 
psychology; namely, the advantage of translational reduction” (ibid., 78). We ought 
to “stop dreaming of deducing science from sense data” (ibid., 84) and we ought to 
“despair of being able to define theoretical terms generally in terms of phenomena” 
(1975a, 72). Hence, we are better off studying the actual relation between theory and 
evidence. 
 
3. TWO STRATEGIES 
 
The argument outlined above is mainly concerned with the empiricists’ ideas about 
the relation between theory and evidence, with their attempts to connect our scientific 
beliefs with our primary sense experiences. Quine argues that we are unable to 
ground our beliefs on sense experience and that we cannot translate our theoretical 
vocabulary in observational terms. Schematically, the problem is that we have (A) our 
primary sense-experiences, and (B) our best scientific theories, but that we do not 
seem to be able to relate (A) and (B) in an epistemologically satisfying way. The 
holistic character of the theory-evidence relation prevents us from establishing an 
epistemologically satisfying connection between the two because a typical single (B)-
sentence “has no distinctive empirical content of its own” (Quine 1984, 125). 
Still, criticizing the epistemologist’s ideas about the relation between theory and 
evidence is not the only way to challenge the traditional project. There remains a 
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second option. Instead of showing that all attempts to base our scientific beliefs on 
some science-independent foundation have failed, one can also attempt to criticize the 
very idea of a science-independent foundation itself. That is, instead of challenging 
the nature of the relation between (A) and (B), one can also call into question the 
epistemological value of connecting (B) with (A) in the first place. One could, for 
example, dismiss the traditionalist’s ideas about the epistemological status of (A) and 
argue that sense experience does not constitute a truly science-independent 
foundation.  
In his “Epistemology Naturalized”, Quine does not discuss this second option.10 
That is, he does not question the idea of a self-sufficient sensory language 
presupposed in the epistemologist's attempts to reduce science to sense experience. 
Quine only argues that once we have adopted a naturalized epistemology, we can 
substitute our talk about sense data with talk about its scientific analogue: the 
physical stimulation of our sensory receptors:  
 
one effect of seeing epistemology in a psychological setting is that it resolves a 
stubborn old enigma of epistemological priority. […] In the old 
epistemological context […] we were out to justify our knowledge of the 
external world by rational reconstruction, and that demands awareness. 
Awareness ceased to be demanded when we gave up trying to justify our 
knowledge of the external world by rational reconstruction. What to count as 
observation now can be settled in terms of the stimulation of sensory receptors.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 At least, Quine does not discuss this second option when it concerns the empiricist program of 
reducing science to sense data.  Quine does use the second strategy when he dismisses the logicist 
program of reducing mathematics to logic and set theory. Quine argues that the logicists failed because 
their foundations were not truly mathematics-independent. According to Quine, set theory is itself a 
branch of mathematics, and so the logicists failed to do “what the epistemologist would like of it”, i.e. 
revealing the ground of mathematical knowledge (Quine 1969a, 70).  
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(Quine 1969a, 84, my emphasis) 
 
In the remainder of this paper, I will argue that both before and after “Epistemology 
Naturalized”, Quine argues exactly the other way around. Quine does not give up on 
sense data because of his naturalism. Rather, he naturalizes epistemology because of 
his doubts about the idea of “a self-sufficient and infallible lore of sense data” 
(1995b, 462). That is, Quine's doubts about ‘epistemological priority’ are not a 
consequence of his naturalism, they are the very reason he adopts a naturalized 
epistemology in the first place. Both before and after “Epistemology Naturalized”, in 
short, Quine does use the second strategy; he criticizes the traditional project because 
he believes that attempts to connect (A) and (B) are futile from an epistemological 
perspective. 
 
4. THE IDEA OF A SELF-SUFFICIENT SENSORY LANGUAGE 
 
From the very beginning of his philosophical career, Quine has thought about the 
relative benefits of phenomenalistic ontologies.  Already in “On What There Is” 
(1948), for example, Quine posed the question of whether we should adopt a 
phenomenalistic or a physicalistic conceptual scheme. His position was a pragmatic 
one: we want an ontology that is as simple as possible, but both conceptual schemes 
are simple in their own respects. A phenomenalistic ontology posits only subjective 
events of sensation, whereas a physicalistic scheme can be said to offer conceptual 
simplicity (1948, 17). 
Despite this pragmatic attitude, however, Quine was already aware that we cannot 
reduce our theoretical vocabulary to sensory terms, that the idea of a complete 
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rational reconstruction is an idle dream: “there is no likelihood that each sentence 
about physical objects can actually be translated […] into the phenomenalistic 
language” (ibid., 18). A few years later, in his “Two Dogmas Empiricism”, Quine of 
course explained why such a strict reduction is impossible: “our statements about the 
external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a 
corporate body” (1951, 41).  
As a result, the main ingredients of “Epistemology Naturalized” were already in 
place in the early 1950s: Quine was already familiar with the possibility of adopting a 
purely physicalistic conceptual scheme, and he had already shown that the traditional 
epistemologists’ attempts at reduction were fruitless. Still, Quine had not yet adopted 
a naturalized epistemology at this point. He still believed that there might be 
epistemological reasons for adopting a phenomenalistic conceptual scheme: 
 
From among the various conceptual schemes best suited to […] various 
pursuits, one⎯the phenomenalistic⎯claims epistemological priority. Viewed 
from within the phenomenalistic conceptual scheme, the ontologies of physical 
objects and mathematical objects are myths. The quality of myth, however, is 
relative; relative, in this case, to the epistemological point of view.  
(1948, 19) 
 
This situation had not changed in Two Dogmas, where Quine continued to talk about 
“sense data” in describing the evidential boundaries of his newly developed holistic 
empiricism (1951, 44).11 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See also Quine's Methods of Logic (1950, xi), where he claims that “[t]he seeing of a green patch, 
and the simultaneous utterance ‘Green patch now’, constitute the sort of composite event which, in its 
rare occurrences, gladdens the heart of the epistemologist”. Cf. (Murphey 2012, 89). 
	   15	  
Between Two Dogmas (1951) and Word and Object (1961) however, Quine did 
switch exclusively to a naturalistic conceptual scheme.  Looking back on this period, 
Quine has referred to the ten years between these two works as the decade in which 
he became “more consciously and explicitly naturalistic”; as the period in which he 
“stiffened up his flabby reference to ‘experience’ by turning to our physical interface 
with the external world: the physical impacts of rays and molecules upon our sensory 
surfaces” (1991, 398). That is, in the decade following Two Dogmas, Quine switched 
from a Carnapian tolerance concerning the question whether to adopt a 
phenomenalistic or a physicalistic conceptual scheme to talking exclusively about 
‘the stimulation of sensory receptors’. 
So why did Quine abandon phenomenalism? Did Quine give up on sense datum 
languages out of despair? Did he, in other words, come to regard the traditional 
perspective as hopeless because we cannot reduce science to sense experience? No he 
did not. What changed is that he became convinced that the very idea of a sense 
datum language is not epistemologically prior to but dependent on our best scientific 
theories of the world; that “[s]ense data are posits too” (1955, 252). Quine came to 
believe that the traditional project was flawed from the beginning; in appealing to a 
phenomenalistic language as a starting point for her inquiries, the epistemologist 
already presupposed a good deal of science: 
 
[t]alk of subjective sense qualities comes mainly as a derivative idiom […] 
Impressed with the fact that we know external things only mediately through 
our senses, philosophers from Berkeley onward have undertaken to strip away 
the physicalistic conjectures and bare the sense data. Yet even as we try to 
recapture the data, in all their innocence of interpretation, we find ourselves 
depending upon sidelong glances into natural science.  
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(1961a, 1-2) 
 
Traditional epistemology builds on the idea that sense data are independent of our 
basic theories of the world. This is why a reduction of our beliefs to sense data would 
constitute a major epistemological achievement.  Quine, however, became convinced 
that this presupposition is incorrect.12 Not our talk of sense data but our talk of 
physical objects is prior; the epistemologists’ starting point is dependent on our 
scientific conceptual scheme. 
As an example of this dependence relation, Quine discusses the idea that our 
elementary experiences are two-dimensional; an idea that Carnap also presupposed in 
the Aufbau when he wanted to assign the sense qualities in our bidimensional visual 
field to points in the three-dimensional physical space order. According to Quine, 
however, the idea that our elementary visual experiences are two-dimensional is itself 
based on rudimentary science: 
 
The old epistemologists may have thought that their atomistic attitude toward 
sense data was grounded in introspection, but it was not. It was grounded in 
their knowledge of the physical world. Berkeley was bent on deriving depth 
from two-dimensional data for no other reason than the physical fact that the 
surface of the eye is two-dimensional.13  
(1973, 2) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  This is not to claim that the early Quine defended this presupposition. As I have argued above, the 
early Quine did not maintain the traditional epistemologist’s perspective. Rather, he defended 
something like a Carnapian tolerance concerning the question whether or not to adopt a 
phenomenalistic or a physicalistic conceptual scheme.	  
13	  See also (Quine 1961a, 2) and (Quine 1975b, 258). 
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Even the very empiricism that underlies the traditional attempts to construct science 
from sense data depends on our scientific picture of the world. We only know that we 
have sense organs because we use them in examining the way in which we obtain our 
information: 
 
The champions of atomic sense data were seeking the unscientific raw 
materials from which natural science is made, but in so doing they were being 
guided, all unawares, by an old discovery that was the work of natural science 
itself […] It is the discovery that all our information about the external world 
reaches us through the impact of external forces on our sensory surfaces […] 
This is a scientific finding, open, as usual, to reconsideration in the light of 
new evidence.14  
(1986, 328) 
 
As a result, sense data are theoretical posits as much as the physical objects that the 
traditional epistemologist attempts to construct from them. The only epistemological 
difference between the two is that our physicalistic conceptual scheme is what 
actually ties our experiences together: “[t]he memories that link our past experiences 
with present ones and induce our expectations are themselves mostly memories not of 
sensory intake but of essentially scientific posits, namely things and events in the 
physical world” (Quine 1995a, 15). We construct sense data only after we have 
acquired an object-based conceptual scheme. This is why painters have to be trained 
to reproduce their three-dimensional view of the world into a two-dimensional picture 
(Quine 1970, 1).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  See also (Quine 1952, 225).	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The standard conception presupposes that traditional epistemology fails because 
we ought to despair of deducing science fully from sense data. The present reflections 
show, however, that Quine’s rejection of traditional epistemology beyond 
“Epistemology Naturalized” is guided by the second strategy distinguished above. 
For Quine, the epistemologists’ quest for foundations was misguided from the 
beginning; there is no epistemologically prior sense datum language, no 
transcendental science-independent perspective from which to validate science: 
 
There is every reason to inquire into the sensory or stimulatory background of 
ordinary talk of physical things. The mistake comes only in seeking an implicit 
sub-basement of conceptualization, or of language. Conceptualization on any 
considerable scale is inseparable from language, and our ordinary language of 
physical things is about as basic as language gets […] If we improve our 
understanding of ordinary talk of physical things, it will not be by reducing 
that talk to a more familiar idiom; there is none.  
(1961a, 3) 
 
5. QUINE’S RESPONSE TO THE SCEPTIC 
 
The idea that Quine’s rejection of first philosophy is guided by an argument against 
transcendence, against a science-independent perspective, is confirmed by his 
response to the sceptic. Recall that, for Quine, traditional epistemology starts from a 
deep dissatisfaction with the problem of error, with “worries about our knowledge of 
the external world” (1995a, 1). Now, if the standard conception were correct, and if 
Quine’s argument against traditional epistemology were indeed an argument from 
despair, his naturalism would constitute a surrender to the sceptic.  For, in despairing 
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of reconstructing science from sense data, Quine would be despairing of the 
epistemologist’s attempt to provide our beliefs with a foundation. In waking up from 
his Cartesian dream, in other words, Quine would be forced to admit that the sceptic 
was right all along; we simply ought to despair of providing our beliefs with the kind 
of justification the sceptic demands.  
In reality, however, Quine does not admit that the sceptic has been right from the 
beginning. Instead of despairing of being able to answer the sceptic, he makes a move 
similar to the one discussed above: he argues that the sceptic too presupposes a good 
deal of science in her inquiries. Where the traditional epistemologist inadvertently 
relied on scientific knowledge in her talk about sense data, the sceptic cannot question 
science without presupposing science: 
 
Doubt prompts the theory of knowledge, yes; but knowledge, also, was what 
prompted the doubt. Scepticism is an offshoot of science. The basis for 
scepticism is the awareness of illusion, the discovery that we must not always 
believe our eyes. Scepticism battens on mirages, on seemingly bent sticks in 
water, on rainbows, after-images, double images, dreams. But in what sense 
are these illusions? In the sense that they seem to be material objects which 
they in fact are not. Illusions are illusions only relative to a prior acceptance of 
genuine bodies with which to contrast them. In a world of immediate sense 
data with no bodies posited and no questions asked, a distinction between 
reality and illusion would have no place. The positing of bodies is already 
rudimentary physical science; and it is only after that stage that the sceptic’s 
invidious distinctions can make sense.15 
(Quine 1975b, 258) 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  See also (Quine 1973, 1-3).	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Sceptical questions are thus questions internal to science. According to Quine, it is 
science itself that shows that our evidence for science is meager; the sceptic needs to 
presuppose at least some theory in order to question it. The sceptic too is misguided 
when she believes that she can coherently doubt the reality of our beliefs from some 
‘implicit sub-basement of conceptualization’, from some self-sufficient science-
independent perspective. Her terms too are only intelligible within a more inclusive 
theory of the world: “the term ‘reality’, the term ‘real’, is a scientific term on a par 
with ‘table’, ‘chair’, ‘electron’, ‘neutrino’, ‘class’, […] all these are part of our 
scientific apparatus, our terminology, so that the only sense I can make of scepticism 
is that somehow our theory is wrong” (1994a, 252).16  
The question of how theory relates to evidence is an open question, but it is a 
question internal to science, it is an immanent challenge. We cannot step outside our 
conceptual scheme and question that scheme all at once. As a transcendental 
challenge scepticism simply makes no sense: “There is no such cosmic exile” (Quine 
1961a, 275), no self-sufficient vantage point from which to question science.17  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 This view about the nature of sceptical challenges Quine also developed in the ten years between 
Two Dogmas and Word and Object. See, for example, Quine’s (1954, 229): “We cannot significantly 
question the reality of the external world, or deny that there is evidence of external objects in the 
testimony of our senses; for, to do so is simply to dissociate the terms ‘reality’ and ‘evidence’ from the 
very applications which originally did most to invest those terms with whatever intelligibility they may 
have for us.” 
17 Are not sceptical challenges just as problematic when we recognize that they are “of a piece with the 
scientific endeavor” (Quine 1981b, 475)? Barry Stroud certainly seems to think so. According to 
Stroud, Quine is “committed at least to the coherence of [the traditional sceptical question] by his very 
conception of knowledge” (1981, 468). Quine, like the traditional epistemologist, distinguishes 
between our objective input from the world and our beliefs about the world as a result of that input. 
According to Stroud, any such “bipartite view of knowledge leaves open the general possibility that the 
objective world is different from the way we take it to be'' and that, in consequence, we can never 
know “that that possibility does not obtain” (ibid.). More metaphorically, Stroud argues that the 
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6. TAKING HOLISM SERIOUSLY 
 
Let me sum up what we have established thus far. Quine’s rejection of first 
philosophy, both before and after “Epistemology Naturalized”, is not based on 
despair, but on his rejection of transcendence, his dismissal of the idea of a science-
independent perspective. According to Quine, “[t]here is no external vantage point, 
no first philosophy” (1969b, 127).18 Both the sceptic and the traditional 
epistemologist presuppose an Archimedean point in their inquiries. The sceptic 
presupposes that she can challenge science from some science-independent 
perspective, while the epistemologist presupposes that she can answer this challenge 
by reducing our theories to some science-independent sensory language.  
Now, what underlies these traditional presuppositions is an absolute distinction 
between theory and evidence. Both the sceptic and the epistemologist rely on a strict 
theory-evidence dichotomy in their inquiries. The sceptic questions our scientific 
theories because she believes that our evidence for these theories is too meager. Yet, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
naturalist, the busy sailor adrift on Neurath's ship, can never dismiss the possibility “of sawing all 
around that meagre portion of the ship that represents our sensory data, and setting the rest of it adrift” 
(1984, 234). 
Stroud's critique would be valid if the standard conception were correct, if Quine had dismissed 
traditional epistemology out of despair. Yet, Quine's view precisely implies that we cannot strictly 
distinguish between our input from the world and our beliefs about the world as a result of that input. 
Sure, Quine has a bipartite view of knowledge, but his bipartite picture is one internal to science. His 
ideas about input and output are immanent ideas. We simply cannot maintain our sense data as a self-
sufficient raft while setting the rest of our ship of knowledge adrift. See Quine (1981b, 474-5). 
18 See also (Quine 1994b, 230): “the immanent is that which makes sense within naturalism, in mediis 
rebus, and the transcendent is not”. 
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her doubts only constitute a transcendental challenge when that very evidence does 
not itself depend on those theories. Similarly, the traditional epistemologist’s project 
of reconstructing science from sense data only constitutes a truly foundational project 
when these sense data themselves are not intruded by our best scientific theories.  
As a result, in both cases Quine’s rejection of transcendence seems to boil down to 
a rejection of an absolute theory-evidence distinction. Indeed, Quine has argued that 
“observation is inseparable from theory” (1996, 477), that we cannot draw a clean 
distinction between an observation’s evidential value and the influence of intrusive 
information. According to Quine, even a very basic one-term observation sentence 
like ‘Red’, which might be taken to report a sense datum, is to some extent 
susceptible to intrusive information. After all, one can imagine extreme cases in 
which we “may be persuaded, by collateral information about odd lighting and 
juxtaposition, that something is really red that did not seem so or vice versa” (Quine 
1961a, 41). This shows that even an innocent observation sentence like ‘Red’ is never 
completely theory-free. It is therefore not surprising that Quine proposes that it would 
make more sense to speak about “degrees of theoreticity”, with sentences like ‘Red’ 
at one extreme and highly theoretic observation sentences like ‘There was copper in 
it’ at the other (1996, 477). 
Ironically, what underlies Quine's rejection of a strict theory-evidence dichotomy 
is his holism. Thus far, I have presented Quine’s holism as a thesis that affects the 
relation between theory and evidence. Our theories are said to be significant only in 
clusters because a single theoretical statement “has no distinctive empirical content of 
its own” (Quine 1984, 125-6). Let us call this modest semantic holism. As we have 
seen, this holism is strong enough to explain why we cannot translate our theoretical 
concepts into observation terms. Yet, modest semantic holism applies only to the 
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theoretical terms and sentences of a theory. Nothing is said about the way in which 
the meanings of observation sentences themselves are constituted. As it now turns 
out, however, the scope of Quine’s holism is considerably broader. After all, if 
‘observation is inseparable from theory’, meaning holism affects our observation 
sentences as well. The meaning of a one-term sentence like ‘Red’ too derives from 
the contribution it makes to our theory as a whole, a thesis that we might call strong 
semantic holism.19 
Quine’s position, then, might be summarized as follows. At the highest level of 
generality, Quine’s rejection of first philosophy is a rejection of transcendence, a 
rejection justified by his strong semantic holism. There is no external vantage point 
because our statements will only make sense within our theory of the world. Quine’s 
dismissal of a strict theory-evidence distinction, and hence his dismissal of both the 
sceptic’s and the traditional epistemologist's presuppositions, is an application of his 
ideas about transcendence and hence a consequence of his strong semantic holism. 
The problem with Quine’s argument from despair is that is too weak. It grants the 
traditional epistemologist and the skeptic their strict theory-evidence distinction and 
argues on the basis of the weaker modest semantic holism that we cannot derive the 
one from the other.  
 
7. THEORY VS. EVIDENCE 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 It should be noted that, for Quine, there is an important sense in which the meaning of observation 
sentences is not affected by semantic holism. I examine this nicety in §7, where I will show that it does 
not affect my conclusion that, in Quine’s view, theory-free observation sentences are not available for 
the traditional epistemologist’s purposes. 
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At this point one might start to wonder whether Quine is not dismissing too much in 
rejecting first philosophy and embracing a strong semantic holism. Is not Quine 
closing off our connection with the world in claiming that observation is inseparable 
from theory, in rejecting an absolute theory-evidence distinction? It might seem that 
if we cannot take our evidence to be theory-free, we are somehow trapped within our 
system of beliefs. It might seem, in other words, that the cure is worse than the 
ailment, that Quine’s views about evidence should be cause for a much greater 
despair than the initial argument that we cannot reconstruct science from sense data.  
It is my contention, however, that such a conclusion would be too strong. Quine’s 
ideas about the relation between theory and evidence are more nuanced then they 
might initially seem to be. In this last section, I will argue that, to some extent, Quine 
does allow theory-free observation sentences; that to some extent, he does allow a 
strict theory-evidence dichotomy. I will argue that Quine only claims that theory-free 
observation sentences are not available for the traditional epistemologist’s purposes. 
The key to understanding Quine’s more nuanced ideas about the relation between 
theory and evidence is his distinction between holophrastic and analytic observation 
sentences. Consider the very basic observation sentence ‘Fluffy cat’, for example, and 
suppose that a subject utters the sentence in the presence of a fluffy cat. If this subject 
is a competent speaker of English, her sentence will contain meaningful parts, it will 
be an analytic observation sentence.20 The speaker knows what is meant by the 
component term ‘cat’ and she uses the word to refer to an object. Furthermore, the 
speaker will be disposed to assent to an alternative observation sentence if that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 The notion of ‘analyticity’ here should not be confused with the notion of analyticity that plays an 
important role in Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction. In order to avoid such 
confusion, Quine also sometimes speaks about ‘taking an observation sentence piecemeal’. See, for 
example, his (1993, 412). 
	   25	  
sentence describes the situation equally well. If the speaker were to learn that a cat 
can also be referred to as a ‘felis catus’, for example, she would immediately be able 
to form the sentence ‘Fluffy felis catus’ and see that the sentence is also true in her 
situation. Moreover, the speaker will be prepared to withdraw her assent to the obser-
vation sentence when she discovers that the catlike object is not really a cat after all.  
An infant who has just learned ‘Fluffy cat’ as one of her first sentences, on the 
other hand, will use the sentence in a completely different holophrastic way. She will 
not see the sentence as composed of distinguishable meaningful parts. Rather, her 
sentence will just be an unstructured whole, a random cry ‘Fluffycat’ that she is 
conditioned to utter or assent to in appropriate circumstances:  
 
Observation sentences contain words that refer to objects when used in mature 
discourse, but the infant first acquires such a sentence only as a seamless 
whole, conditioned⎯like the signal cry of the ape⎯to an appropriate range of 
global neural intakes.  
(Quine 1995b, 464-5) 
 
The infant does not use the sentence to refer to a particular object. Rather, she is 
trained to utter the complete sentence as an unstructured whole in relevant situations. 
As a result, even if she were to be conditioned to utter the sentence ‘felis catus’ in 
these circumstances, she would not automatically be able to form the sentence ‘Fluffy 
felis catus’. Furthermore, the infant at this stage will also not be able to withdraw her 
assent to any observation sentence in the light of new information: “[s]econd thoughts 
are not yet relevant; they become so only at a later stage, when scientific theory has 
begun to interrelate observation sentences and generate conflict” Quine 1996, 476). 
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Now, according to Quine, in the latter holophrastic sense observation sentences 
are theory-free, i.e. independent of intrusive information. As soon as a speaker has 
learned to use her observation sentences analytically, however, a complicated process 
that proceeds by “short leaps” (1975b, 267), these sentences will fall within the scope 
of Quine's strong semantic holism. That is, these sentences too will be significant 
only in clusters, and the meanings of its terms too will be established together, by the 
totality of relations between the sentences of her theory.  
 
[Holophrastic observation sentences] are associated as wholes to appropriate 
ranges of stimulation, by conditioning. Component words are there merely as 
component syllables, theory-free. But these words recur in theoretical contexts 
in the fullness of time. It is precisely this sharing of words, by observation 
sentences and theoretical sentences, that provides logical connections between 
the two kinds of sentences and makes observation relevant to scientific theory.  
(1990, 7) 
 
As a result, Quine's distinction between holophrastic and analytic observation 
sentences perfectly illustrates the scope of his strong semantic holism. As soon as a 
speaker starts to master his language beyond the stage of conditioned “animal cries” 
(1993, 412), meaning holism sets in. The word ‘cat’ starts to occur in more and more 
observations sentences and the infant gradually acquires the ability to form new 
sentences all by herself; a point in her development at which she already relies on a 
substantive object-based theory of the world. In consequence, as soon as we have 
acquired the bare essentials of our language and the capacity to refer, our observation 
sentences too will become only meaningful in clusters. That is, the meaning of our 
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observation terms too will derive from the contribution they make to our theory as a 
whole. 
The distinction between holophrastic and analytic observation sentences therefore 
explains why Quine believes it to be impossible to develop a phenomenalistic 
language that is truly independent of science. For, whenever the epistemologist starts 
her inquiry with sentences like ‘Red patch now’, she will only have provided a 
theory-free science-independent foundation if she uses these sentences 
holophrastically, if she considers them as unstructured wholes. Yet, holophrastic 
observation sentences will not be of any use for the traditional epistemologist’s 
purposes, precisely because they are radically unstructured and theory-free. The 
ability of an infant to utter the one-term sentence ‘Red’ in the holophrastic sense, 
whenever confronted with a red experience, does not amount to anything more than 
her ability to cry whenever she has hurt herself. She cannot yet refer to the color or 
use the term in an epistemologically interesting sense: “We can credit the child at this 
point with being able to discriminate red, to recognize red. […]  But to say that he 
refers to the color would be to impute our ontology to him” (1973, 81-3). Using 
sentences like ‘Red patch now’ in the holophrastic sense as a foundation for science, 
even if this would be possible for the epistemologist who has already mastered the 
English language, is therefore fruitless. Without the ability to refer and the ability to 
utter truth-valued sentences, the traditional epistemologist’s project will never get off 
the ground. It is only in the analytic sense that observation sentences can be linked 
with scientific theory. Yet, in the analytic sense the component terms of observation 
sentences cannot be separated from the theoretical system in which they take part.  
As a result, even though Quine’s argument against traditional epistemology rests 
on his strong semantic holism, his rejection of a strict theory-evidence distinction is 
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no cause for despair; our observation sentences remain ultimately grounded in theory-
free responses to sensory stimulation. According to Quine, we can maintain that 
“observation sentences stay on in their old definition and their role as […] the 
checkpoints of science”, even if we have to acknowledge that observation is 
inseparable from theory (1996, 477). 
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have examined Quine's reasons for dismissing traditional 
epistemology. I have challenged the claim that his argument is one from despair. 
Quine does not reject traditional epistemology because we cannot reduce our science 
to sense data. Rather, Quine dismisses the project as flawed from the beginning: it is 
impossible to develop a self-sufficient sensory language, independent of our best 
scientific theories of the world. The search for a transcendental perspective, 
independent of science, is a mistake. Quine’s argument is supported by his strong 
semantic holism, the thesis that the meanings of both our theoretical and our 
observation statements, considered analytically, derive from the contribution they 
make to our theory as a whole. As a result, observation is to a large extent inseparable 
from theory, and we are all bound to start our inquiries from within; even sceptical 
questions are immanent.  
Let me, in conclusion, examine how we might interpret “Epistemology 
Naturalized” in the light of these findings; that is, examine how we might make better 
sense of Quine’s argument in the paper. I believe that the paper can be better 
understood if we keep in mind the distinction between immanent and transcendental 
inquiry. As we have seen above, there are two ways in which one might interpret 
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sceptical challenges. In the transcendental reading, the sceptic is seen as questioning 
science from some science-independent external vantage point, while in the 
immanent reading scepticism is a challenge from within. Quine dismisses the 
transcendental challenge as incoherent but admits that sceptical scenarios are live 
possibilities when construed immanently.  
Now, since the epistemologist’s project of reducing science to sense data is 
supposed to provide an answer to the sceptic’s challenge, it admits two interpretations 
as well. On the one hand, one can interpret rational reconstruction as an attempt to 
fulfill the Cartesian dream, to provide a foundation for knowledge from some 
science-independent sensory language. In this transcendental reading, rational 
reconstruction is a project within first philosophy. As we have seen, Quine dismisses 
this project as incoherent because he rejects the idea of a self-sufficient sensory 
language. Yet, one can also interpret “rational reconstruction” as a project internal to 
science, as a relatively innocent attempt to reconstruct the relation between theory 
and evidence. In this reading, the project does not presuppose an external vantage 
point. One can just posit a phenomenalistic language, acknowledge that this language 
is not self-sufficient, and examine whether we can simplify our theory of the world by 
reducing our scientific talk to this language. In this reading, the project need not be 
dismissed because it presupposes an implicit sub-basement of conceptualization. 
Rather, it fails because we ought to despair of ever being able to successfully define 
the empirical content of a single theoretical statement in isolation. 
In this paper, I have limited my discussion to the transcendental interpretation and 
contended that Quine's argument against this type of rational reconstruction is not an 
argument from despair. Yet, the careful reader of Quine after “Epistemology 
	   30	  
Naturalized” will notice that Quine has never limited himself to either one of these 
two interpretations. Consider, for example, the following passages: 
 
[v]arious epistemologists, from Descartes to Carnap, […] sought a foundation 
for natural science in mental entities, the flux of raw sense data. It was as if we 
might first fashion a self-sufficient and infallible lore of sense data, innocent of 
reference to physical things, and then build a theory of the external world 
somehow on that finished foundation. The naturalistic epistemologist dismisses 
this dream of a prior sense-datum language.21 
(1995b, 462) 
 
My attitude toward the project of a rational reconstruction of the world from 
sense data is […] naturalistic. I do not regard the project as incoherent, though 
its motivation in some cases is confused. I see it as a project of positing a realm 
of entities intimately related to the stimulation of the sensory surfaces, and then 
[…] to construct a language adequate to natural science. It is an attractive idea, 
for it would bring scientific discourse into a much more explicit and systematic 
relation to its observational checkpoint. My only reservation is that I am 
convinced, regretfully, that it cannot be done.22  
(1981a, 23) 
 
Although Quine is talking about the same project in both passages, viz. reconstructing 
science out of sense data, the former constitutes a transcendental and the latter 
constitutes an immanent reading of the project. For, whereas the former talks about 
‘seeking a foundation for science’, the latter talks about ‘positing’ sense data and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  See also (Quine 1986, 327-8).	  
22	  See also (Quine 1996, 477).	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about bringing ‘scientific discourse into a much more explicit and systematic relation 
to its observational checkpoint’. It is because of this reason that Quine uses a distinct 
argument in each case. In the former he rejects the idea of a self-sufficient sense 
datum language and in the latter he is convinced, regretfully, that the project cannot 
be fulfilled. 
Now let me turn to “Epistemology Naturalized”. Quine’s goal in the paper is to 
convince the reader that we should abandon “creative reconstruction” and that we 
should examine how the construction of scientific theories “really proceeds”. In order 
to establish this, Quine argues that there are no advantages of rational reconstruction 
over ‘straight psychology’. Now, when one reads Quine's paper with the above 
distinction between immanent and transcendental reconstruction in the back of one's 
mind, one finds that Quine is almost exclusively concerned with dismissing the 
advantages of rational reconstruction in its immanent reading. Quine spends almost 
no time on rejecting the Cartesian quest for a foundation of knowledge. He uses only 
a few words to argue that, with respect to the doctrinal side of epistemology, we are 
no farther along today than where Hume left us (ibid., 72). The implication here is 
that since the doctrinal project fails, the transcendental quest for foundations can be 
abandoned, both on its conceptual and its doctrinal side. It is at this point, that Quine 
could have inserted his argument against self-sufficient sensory languages; but he did 
not, probably because he presupposed that the reader already accepted the 
hopelessness of the project. The bulk of Quine's argument is concerned with 
dismissing the advantages of Carnap’s project (ibid., 72-80), a project that he 
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interprets immanently as he emphasizes that Carnap already saw the “Cartesian quest 
for certainty […] as a lost cause” (ibid., 74).23  
Quine does not interpret Carnap as a first philosopher aiming to validate our 
scientific theories. Rather, he believes that the advantage of Carnap’s project, if it 
were to succeed, is that it would “elicit and clarify the sensory evidence for science” 
(ibid., 74); a project that is immanent, as it will only legitimize the concepts of 
science “to whatever degree the concepts of set theory, logic, and observation are 
themselves legitimate” (ibid., 76). Given this immanent interpretation of Carnap’s 
project, it is no surprise that he uses his argument from despair to dismiss it. 
My suggestion, therefore, is that one should not read “Epistemology Naturalized” 
as an argument against traditional epistemology in its transcendental interpretation, 
even though some passages invite such a reading.24  Quine and Carnap (and many 
other epistemologists for that matter) had already rejected this type of first philosophy 
elsewhere. Rather, Quine was concerned with the type of “creative reconstruction” 
that continued to be an essential element of Carnap's epistemology. Quine's aim was 
not to show that this type of inquiry is naturalistically unacceptable, he only 
attempted to establish that this project, regretfully, could not be fulfilled, that “[w]e 
must despair of any such reduction” (1969a, 77).25 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	   See also (Quine 1995a, 13): “Carnap's motivation was not [the] traditional quest for certainty. 
Rather, his goal was just a systematic integration […] of our scientific concepts of mind and nature 
[…] His choice of experiences rather than physical objects as his foundations was, he assures us, just a 
matter of strategy.” 
24 One of the most confusing elements of “Epistemology Naturalized” is that Quine uses the term 
‘epistemology’ to denote both the Cartesian quest for certainty and the relatively innocent attempt to 
examine the relation between theory and evidence. In this respect, I agree with Johnsen that 
“Epistemology Naturalized” fails to expose Quine's views as clearly as possible. See footnote 5.	  
25	  I thank Jeanne Peijnenburg, the anonymous referees for this Journal, and the people who attended 
my talks at the Universities of Groningen and Athens for their suggestions and comments. This 
research is funded by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO), Grant 322-20-001.  
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